Skelton Says 3 Allegations Substantiated
This breaking news story coincides with an ongoing series of reports about Whiteman Air Force Base, its problems and its personnel — past and present.
By Kenneth Amos
Star-Journal News Editor
Results are forthcoming about an investigation launched by Missouri Fourth District Congressman Ike Skelton, who has been looking into — and partially substantiated — allegations made by Capt. Eugene R. Essex during a community forum three months ago in Warrensburg.
At that time, Capt. Essex charged, "nuclear weapons are mishandled every day" at Whiteman Air Force Base.
On Monday, the Congressman said that as a result of his investigation, the inspector general of the Air Force indeed has acknowledged various problems with the handling of the weapons system at the western-Missouri air base.
Only a few months earlier, Capt. Essex had been hustled off to a mental hospital in Texas for reporting these and other alleged violations to his superiors.
Skelton, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, met in Washington D.C. on Monday with Lt. Gen. Howard Leaf in a daylong session. Skelton said he could only reveal the violations involved testing procedures, personnel evaluation procedures, technical violations and the possible mishandling of control pages or code pages.
"Thus, my next step is to now visit with the chairman of the House Armed Services Investigation Subcommittee to see what should be done to determine which steps should be taken to correct these alleged deficiencies."
After meeting with Skelton yesterday, Rep Richard White, D-Texas, chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations, said his panel had sent a letter to Maj. Gen. Guy L. Hecker, Jr., U S Air Force legislative liaison, indicating the problems outlined by the congressman appeared to be serious White has asked for a written report regarding corrective measures that will be taken at WAFB regarding the violations. It is due June 22.
Skelton said the letter partially supported at least three allegations made by Capt. Essex, including:
The loss and mishandling of Minuteman launch codes: Capt. Essex contends Minuteman Entry Control System code pages are frequently mishandled. Lost or illegally retained code pages compromise missile-silo-entry combinations. He noted the frequency of lost code pages might be best gauged by disciplinary actions taken when code pages are found and reported. Most lost or illegally retained code pages are not reported according to the captain.
Cheating on simulator tests by personnel involved in launch control: Capt. Essex charged cheating on Standboard evaluations (officers and enlisted) occurs regularly. Standboard evaluations measure system knowledge and abilities o perform hands-on technical operations with nuclear weapons and their support and control equipment.
According to the captain, cheating occurs most often between officers and enlisted (personnel) who evaluate their fellow evaluators. For example, Essex noted a sergeant was fired as an evaluator when he insisted a fellow evaluator who committed a critical error be given an honest "unqualified" rating. Another example occurred when an officer who committed a critical error was awarded a "highly qualified" rating by his fellow evaluator superiors. Seven officers, according to Capt. Essex, witnessed the critical error. The captain said persons who commit critical errors are unqualified to perform duties around nuclear weapons until they are retrained and recertified.
The manual opening of alarm circuit breakers by launch crewmembers.Capt. Essex maintains such violation of technical orders when operating, controlling or maintaining nuclear weapons and associated equipment occurs regularly.
One example he cited concerned two launch-control officers who allowed their standoff timers to lapse in 1979, resulting in the loss of control of their missiles. The officers were declared "unqualified" immediately.
The captain believes loss of control resulted from in competence and-or silencing of timer alarms, in violation of technical orders. The crew — a Standboard select team — was promoted. Capt. Essex said the silencing of alarms, in violation of technical orders, occurs regularly, so one crewmember might sleep.
Lt. Gen. Leaf stressed Monday that none of the problems existing at the base pose any danger of a nuclear mishap and the Air Force was working to correct them.
Skelton said he believed WAFB is "one of the very best, if not the best missile base in the nation." However, he added, "My main concerns are (for) the safety of the people in Missouri and national security. That is why I'm taking these steps at this time."
Capt. Essex had sent a letter, dated March 23, 1981, along with a "dozen representative samples of nuclear-safety violations at WAFB (including the three mentioned earlier), to President Reagan and six congressmen (including Skelton). He refused to discuss with the media the details of the correspondences. However, in a copy of the letter obtained from other sources, Essex states:
"Nuclear weapons assigned to the 351st Strategic Missile Wing at Whiteman are not handled and controlled in accordance with stringent nuclear safety regulations.
"One hundred and fifty Minuteman missiles are deployed at Whiteman. They are assigned two missions: One is to deliver thermonuclear warheads on an enemy in time of war. The second is to activate the Emergency Rocket Communication System (ERCS), which is critical to the execution of the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), or nuclear war plan." He suggests, "most occur through wilfull violation of explicit nuclear safety rules. A command staff that condones incompetent management and the coverup of embarrassing violations contributes to the nature and frequency of the nuclear safety violations."
Among his charges, Essex contends:
* In 1979, poor coordination between maintenance, operations, intelligence and planning staffs resulted in conditions for a serious compromise and degradation of the ERCS. He noted prompt action by a launch officer "precluded compromise at the last possible moment."
* Insertion of false Cancel Launch-In-Progress codes resulted in an inoperative failsafe system in 1978, according to the captain.
* Numerous errors were made in programming Minuteman targeting and guidance systems, resulting in missiles that would respond unpredictably if given launch instructions. He claims such an error occurred in January 1980, and another similar error was made when January 1978 targeting instructions were installed in a missile instead of June 1978 instructions.
* Cheating on tests that measure launch officers' abilities to respond to Emergency War Orders (EWO) results in officers who may not respond properly in crisis situations. Capt. Essex noted cheating was so common that a major who was chief of the EWO testing section had to issue special instructions to bring it to a halt. When it continued, he implemented a two-color system to make it more difficult for officers to openly cheat.
* Security zone violations occur regularly. These types of violations are wide-ranging, including launch officers who fail to report or improperly report security alarms, or who fail to follow required procedures when processing people onto or off of missile sites.
An additional example is the canceling of security alarms by security monitors because the alarms "probably are caused by the wind or animals, and not by someone trying to penetrate the nuclear weapons storage area."
Yet another example, according to Capt. Essex, is security guards who illegally adjust security transmitters so the security system will "reset" and allow the guards to go home. An improperly adjusted security system facilitates illegal penetration of a missile site.
* Compromise of ERCS locations (classified) occurs regularly. Some compromises occur during Airborne Launch Control System radio communications. Others occur during launch capsule-to-maintenance team communications. In an informal survey conducted last year, according the Capt. Essex, persons unauthorized to know where the ERCS was located "guessed" where it was, based on limited observations of activities. The guesses were more than 50 percent correct. Many such compromises go unreported.
* Classified information about nuclear weapons systems, and problems are discussed openly in barrooms and other unsecured areas.
Capt. Essex said, for example, he learned about a Minuteman warhead that was damaged last year, while attending a mandatory Commander's Call in the Officer's Club.
He alleges, in the barroom, officers discussed the type of warhead damaged, how the damage occurred (during break-in operations when faulty equipment-maintenance resulted in a lockout), the effect the launch-closure equipment had on the warhead when it smashed into the missile, and other details that were classified or for official use only.
Top-secret code changes, classified plans, and other similar information frequently is discussed openly in the club barrooms and other unsecured locations. The information is available to whoever wishes to listen, according to Capt. Essex.
When informed last night about the work of Skelton, the captain responded: "I am encouraged about his attempts to resolve this problem. I concur with him that it is very serious. My word to Congressman Skelton is "thanks" and please keep it up; don't stop.
By Kenneth Amos
Star-Journal News Editor
Results are forthcoming about an investigation launched by Missouri Fourth District Congressman Ike Skelton, who has been looking into — and partially substantiated — allegations made by Capt. Eugene R. Essex during a community forum three months ago in Warrensburg.
At that time, Capt. Essex charged, "nuclear weapons are mishandled every day" at Whiteman Air Force Base.
On Monday, the Congressman said that as a result of his investigation, the inspector general of the Air Force indeed has acknowledged various problems with the handling of the weapons system at the western-Missouri air base.
Only a few months earlier, Capt. Essex had been hustled off to a mental hospital in Texas for reporting these and other alleged violations to his superiors.
Skelton, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, met in Washington D.C. on Monday with Lt. Gen. Howard Leaf in a daylong session. Skelton said he could only reveal the violations involved testing procedures, personnel evaluation procedures, technical violations and the possible mishandling of control pages or code pages.
"Thus, my next step is to now visit with the chairman of the House Armed Services Investigation Subcommittee to see what should be done to determine which steps should be taken to correct these alleged deficiencies."
After meeting with Skelton yesterday, Rep Richard White, D-Texas, chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations, said his panel had sent a letter to Maj. Gen. Guy L. Hecker, Jr., U S Air Force legislative liaison, indicating the problems outlined by the congressman appeared to be serious White has asked for a written report regarding corrective measures that will be taken at WAFB regarding the violations. It is due June 22.
Skelton said the letter partially supported at least three allegations made by Capt. Essex, including:
The loss and mishandling of Minuteman launch codes: Capt. Essex contends Minuteman Entry Control System code pages are frequently mishandled. Lost or illegally retained code pages compromise missile-silo-entry combinations. He noted the frequency of lost code pages might be best gauged by disciplinary actions taken when code pages are found and reported. Most lost or illegally retained code pages are not reported according to the captain.
Cheating on simulator tests by personnel involved in launch control: Capt. Essex charged cheating on Standboard evaluations (officers and enlisted) occurs regularly. Standboard evaluations measure system knowledge and abilities o perform hands-on technical operations with nuclear weapons and their support and control equipment.
According to the captain, cheating occurs most often between officers and enlisted (personnel) who evaluate their fellow evaluators. For example, Essex noted a sergeant was fired as an evaluator when he insisted a fellow evaluator who committed a critical error be given an honest "unqualified" rating. Another example occurred when an officer who committed a critical error was awarded a "highly qualified" rating by his fellow evaluator superiors. Seven officers, according to Capt. Essex, witnessed the critical error. The captain said persons who commit critical errors are unqualified to perform duties around nuclear weapons until they are retrained and recertified.
The manual opening of alarm circuit breakers by launch crewmembers.Capt. Essex maintains such violation of technical orders when operating, controlling or maintaining nuclear weapons and associated equipment occurs regularly.
One example he cited concerned two launch-control officers who allowed their standoff timers to lapse in 1979, resulting in the loss of control of their missiles. The officers were declared "unqualified" immediately.
The captain believes loss of control resulted from in competence and-or silencing of timer alarms, in violation of technical orders. The crew — a Standboard select team — was promoted. Capt. Essex said the silencing of alarms, in violation of technical orders, occurs regularly, so one crewmember might sleep.
Lt. Gen. Leaf stressed Monday that none of the problems existing at the base pose any danger of a nuclear mishap and the Air Force was working to correct them.
Skelton said he believed WAFB is "one of the very best, if not the best missile base in the nation." However, he added, "My main concerns are (for) the safety of the people in Missouri and national security. That is why I'm taking these steps at this time."
Capt. Essex had sent a letter, dated March 23, 1981, along with a "dozen representative samples of nuclear-safety violations at WAFB (including the three mentioned earlier), to President Reagan and six congressmen (including Skelton). He refused to discuss with the media the details of the correspondences. However, in a copy of the letter obtained from other sources, Essex states:
"Nuclear weapons assigned to the 351st Strategic Missile Wing at Whiteman are not handled and controlled in accordance with stringent nuclear safety regulations.
"One hundred and fifty Minuteman missiles are deployed at Whiteman. They are assigned two missions: One is to deliver thermonuclear warheads on an enemy in time of war. The second is to activate the Emergency Rocket Communication System (ERCS), which is critical to the execution of the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), or nuclear war plan." He suggests, "most occur through wilfull violation of explicit nuclear safety rules. A command staff that condones incompetent management and the coverup of embarrassing violations contributes to the nature and frequency of the nuclear safety violations."
Among his charges, Essex contends:
* In 1979, poor coordination between maintenance, operations, intelligence and planning staffs resulted in conditions for a serious compromise and degradation of the ERCS. He noted prompt action by a launch officer "precluded compromise at the last possible moment."
* Insertion of false Cancel Launch-In-Progress codes resulted in an inoperative failsafe system in 1978, according to the captain.
* Numerous errors were made in programming Minuteman targeting and guidance systems, resulting in missiles that would respond unpredictably if given launch instructions. He claims such an error occurred in January 1980, and another similar error was made when January 1978 targeting instructions were installed in a missile instead of June 1978 instructions.
* Cheating on tests that measure launch officers' abilities to respond to Emergency War Orders (EWO) results in officers who may not respond properly in crisis situations. Capt. Essex noted cheating was so common that a major who was chief of the EWO testing section had to issue special instructions to bring it to a halt. When it continued, he implemented a two-color system to make it more difficult for officers to openly cheat.
* Security zone violations occur regularly. These types of violations are wide-ranging, including launch officers who fail to report or improperly report security alarms, or who fail to follow required procedures when processing people onto or off of missile sites.
An additional example is the canceling of security alarms by security monitors because the alarms "probably are caused by the wind or animals, and not by someone trying to penetrate the nuclear weapons storage area."
Yet another example, according to Capt. Essex, is security guards who illegally adjust security transmitters so the security system will "reset" and allow the guards to go home. An improperly adjusted security system facilitates illegal penetration of a missile site.
* Compromise of ERCS locations (classified) occurs regularly. Some compromises occur during Airborne Launch Control System radio communications. Others occur during launch capsule-to-maintenance team communications. In an informal survey conducted last year, according the Capt. Essex, persons unauthorized to know where the ERCS was located "guessed" where it was, based on limited observations of activities. The guesses were more than 50 percent correct. Many such compromises go unreported.
* Classified information about nuclear weapons systems, and problems are discussed openly in barrooms and other unsecured areas.
Capt. Essex said, for example, he learned about a Minuteman warhead that was damaged last year, while attending a mandatory Commander's Call in the Officer's Club.
He alleges, in the barroom, officers discussed the type of warhead damaged, how the damage occurred (during break-in operations when faulty equipment-maintenance resulted in a lockout), the effect the launch-closure equipment had on the warhead when it smashed into the missile, and other details that were classified or for official use only.
Top-secret code changes, classified plans, and other similar information frequently is discussed openly in the club barrooms and other unsecured locations. The information is available to whoever wishes to listen, according to Capt. Essex.
When informed last night about the work of Skelton, the captain responded: "I am encouraged about his attempts to resolve this problem. I concur with him that it is very serious. My word to Congressman Skelton is "thanks" and please keep it up; don't stop.