Former Airman Contends More Problems
Existed Than Air Force Officials Admitted
This series of reports investigates charges of frequent mishandling of nuclear weapons at Whiteman Air Force Base. It is based on interviews conducted by The Daily Star-Journal during the past three months in collaboration with WDAF-TV, Channel 4, in Kansas City. The television station's series, "Failsafe," is being broadcast this week during its 10 p.m. newscast.
By Kenneth Amos
Star-Journal News Editor
(Fourth of a series)
Paul Geoffrey Sample is back home in his native California, far away from the daily grind at Whiteman Air Force Base. However, the 27-year-old former senior airman still agonizes about the unacceptable manner in which nuclear weapons have been handled at the base, and the subsequent way he has been treated for simply doing what he believed was his duty.
Sample, a former missile-maintenance specialist, was separated from the Air Force last October via an honorable discharge. However, he claims he was one of the lucky ones.
Part of Sample's story has been told before. Earlier this year, in a newspaper interview, he told of learning of weapons mishandling within the Re-Entry Vehicle Maintenance Branch of the 351st Field Maintenance Missile Squadron. The problem was that a missile on alert contained a targeting error in its re-entry vehicle weapon. He maintained the error was covered up by airmen and a sergeant in the maintenance area.
The error, he said, possibly could have caused one of the 150 Minuteman missiles controlled at Whiteman Air Force Base to explode short of its intended target.
An investigation by the Air Force ensued during which Sample testified. Missouri Fourth District Congressman Ike Skelton earlier this year asked for a briefing about this particular investigation from the Air Force.
The Air Force confirmed there was indeed a targeting error that would have produced "a less-than-optimal target burst."
Skelton also was informed that an unreliable Penetration Aid (Pen Aid) had been discovered. A Pen Aid, loosely defined, helps a weapon hide from enemy radar.
The military branch maintained the problem with the Pen Aid was detected before it could be installed into a missile on alert.
The Air Force also assured Skelton the problems had been corrected and sufficient precautions taken to ensure they would never happen again. A sergeant involved allegedly concealed the problem and supposedly was disciplined.
Sample, earlier this week, revealed that part of the story has not been made public. He said that he and several other airmen testified they had discovered not one, but several unreliable Pen Aids, contrary to the public admission by the Air Force. He maintains at least one was installed into a missile that was on alert. Yet another was on its way to the field.
The former airman said the only reason the Pen Aid did not reach its destination is because "I substituted if for a good one at the last minute."
He added the NCO in his section had told him the Pen Aids were reliable.
Several in one of the maintenance bays were scheduled to go out in a couple of weeks," Sample said.
He said none had been tested or could have possibly been tested in that timeframe.
I could have just let them go to the field and allowed something to go wrong, therefore establishing a trend," he said.
Sample said at least 13 Pen Aids were suspected of being unreliable, and he eventually narrowed that group to five or six.
"They were definitely on their way out (to the field) unless someone stopped them," he said.
For a Pen Aid to be termed "unreliable," a serious problem does not have to be substantiated, according to Sample. A Pen Aid is deemed unreliable if it is not checked out properly and there is no way to know how it would perform. Subsequent tests proved all Pen Aids in question to be reliable.
Sample said he has been disheartened that it has taken this long for a congressman to pay attention to his allegations.
In the past, he charged that persons looking into the problems "have come down the chain of command to where the problem started, and it feeds back up the chain of command that there is nothing wrong, and the whole thing is covered up."
Sample said he finally heard from one of Skelton's aides in Washington, D.C., yesterday. He was asked for more information about his allegations
From the beginning
Sample's plight began several years ago when he became aware of the aforementioned problems from a co-worker who mentioned it "rather casually (and) was unspecific."
He claimed the problem existed and was known of during the Defense Nuclear Agency Inspection at WAFB in 1978.
"There was a problem with a warhead in the field. He wouldn't really say where it was, what the problem was, or what the maintenance schedule for it was."
Sample said it took about six months for him to gain the confidence of those who knew about the problem so they would become more specific about its exact nature.
I found out that it was a targeting problem."
Saying he could not expound further because of his concern about revealing classified information, Sample said had the problem gone uncorrected, the missile involved would not have performed as it was designed.
"There was no danger to the American population," he said, "in this case."
Sample said the main obstacle that took so long in approaching the problem was "the atmosphere in the shop. Everyone was afraid to talk about it. It was something that was never spoken of, never brought up."
Extreme tension, fear and suspicion were words Sample used to describe the atmosphere in his work center.
In response to this allegation, Air Force officials at Whiteman replied: " Inspections by Strategic Air Command's missile evaluation squadron rated our munitions program areas from satisfactory to outstanding in October 1980. An April 1981 inspection by the SAC inspector general rated the re-entry vehicle branch 'excellent' and the associated technical operations 'outstanding.' "
Sample and other airmen, after learning enough about the problem, approached their supervisors.
I was surprised to find they didn't want to deal with it. I was given an explanation that these things are usually kept within the shop."
Sample was told it was on a "hypothetical" situation.
"Nobody had any specific information on it. ... The people who had the actual knowledge of the incident, and who had witnessed it, wouldn't discuss it."
Then, one of Sample's co-workers approached Whiteman's three squadron officials with the information about the targeting error.
"They also refused to do anything about it," Sample maintained. "It wasn't like they refused to him; it's just that nothing happened. There was no response. No one came in to correct the problem."
Sample said the situation then was reported to the base inspector general (IG).
"It was immediately and promptly corrected," he said. "The inspector general's investigator was appointed on Whiteman. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) subsequently investigated it, and the Air Force investigator was sent down to Whiteman," Sample said.
In the week's interval between the time the problem was reported to the base IG, and when the Air Force Investigator finally arrived, "three top officials in the squadron, who had knowledge of this incident and had made no attempt to correct it, were place in exclusive access of all classified records for the entire weapons system." He claims this is out of the norm when it comes to investigative procedures.
The OSI's investigation lasted only three days. Without warning, it was pulled off the case, according to Sample. He was told the OSI had found no criminal action involved.
Sample, a primary witness, had provided three affidavits and hours of sworn and taped testimony pertaining to the actions of the branch supervisors.
He provided material evidence, and, in return, contends an OSI agent assured him that measures would be taken to relieve him from serving under the authority of the individuals against whom he had testified. Also, he claims he was assured that his Airman Performance Reports (APRs) would not have to be endorsed by these individuals.
Sample said he was told non-judicial punishment was administered to both supervisors. Allegedly, they were fined and suspended from duty for almost five months.
One was fully reinstated to his duty position as the Branch Noncommissioned Officer In Charge. The other was reinstated and given new duties as Quality Control Inspector for the Branch. Each had their personnel reliability status restored.
"After all this time, they were returned to duty as if nothing ever happened," Sample said. "The shop functioned as it was before. The same people were there. I was there. The other witnesses were there. The chain of command was the same.
"At that point, I tentatively resigned."
Three days later, in April 1980, Sample contends his latest APR was recalled from the records section by one of the sergeants for "corrections." The report was downgraded.
The revised report ran counter to comments of Sample's supervisor, who had recommended him for an Air Force Commendation Medal.
Sample called it "the most derogatory report they could have given anyone without supporting evidence."
He had gone to his squadron commander's office and said that "under no circumstances am I going to work under these people in view of what they have done."
Sample then received an assignment to Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, only to find out he had been assigned to work under a supervisor who was a close personal friend of one of the supervisors against whom he had given testimony.
Time to move on
Sample asked the squadron commander to interrupt his assignment overseas. The squadron commander, the only person with the authority to do so, refused.
Sample took up the matter with officials in the OSI office.
"They refused to even discuss it with me."
The OSI, Sample claims, did not comply with its promises and procedures to protect his career from administrative abuse.
Sample said the situation boiled down to this: Those who provided testimony were referred to (the) mental health (section) for aberrant personality or character disorders. They had testified against their supervisors. They had complained about being forced to work under people against whom they had testified. The working environment was unacceptable. There were no provisions to protect them. And, they were shipped off to the psychiatric ward.
This happened to Sample, too, albeit in a roundabout way.
"I went to the mental health section to ask them an administrative question about the reliability program. A day later, my commander found out that I had been over there. He ordered me to return for psychiatric evaluation on the basis that I had submitted myself for an evaluation previously and then refused evaluation, which is totally not true. At no time did I ever willingly submit myself for evaluation. I had no need to. I never had any doubt about my own reliability."
Sample, who had been decertified in accordance with the Air Force's Personnel Reliability Program, underwent six months of psychiatric evaluations. In the meantime, he was placed on "medical hold" and his assignment to South Korea was cancelled.
Only a few months earlier, Sample was going places in the Air Force. Earlier APRs contain comments such as: "Sample performs all his duties in an excellent manner. His resourcefulness, foresight and professional job knowledge clearly are reflected in the day-to-day operations. Also, Sample sets and example of the highest tradition of military professionalism and consistently demands exceptional performance from his co-workers. His is an alert airman who is highly intelligent. ..."
Now, while under observation, he had been assigned various menial duties around the base, including trash detail and the wash rack.
"Wash rack was an assignment for three months — scrubbing the tar off trucks — a duty I'm sure they considered was fully commensurate with my ability and my training," he said sarcastically while noting that airmen usually are assigned this detail for one week at a time.
After six months of ongoing evaluations, "the hospital finally concluded there were no mental disorders, no psychiatric disorders, no character or behavioral disorders."
Sample filed for separation from the Air Force and appealed his performance reports.
During the evaluations, Sample had filed requests to be cross-trained, transferred to another base or discharged.
"In two weeks, I was decertified permanently from my reliability status by my squadron commander. That means I will never ever again be authorized to work around any nuclear materials of any kind, in any capacity. That is all I have been trained to do for the past three years. They just declared me totally useless for what they had trained me to do."
He said the Air Force reluctantly accepted his request for a hardship discharge.
After the discharge, he received a letter ordering him never to set foot on the base again. Also, his performance report had been reversed and corrected. However, he said his request for reinstatement of his reliability status "has virtually been disregarded."
Reviewing his experiences, Sample asks:
*Why was everyone so frightened in that maintenance shop? They wouldn't even talk about a problem; they were more afraid of correcting it than they were of covering it up.
"That's an inexcusable condition. The condition still exists. If the Air Force tries to make an example of me it will exist to an even greater extent. Their image isn't worth the risk to national security of covering up some of these problems. They are much too serious.
While this problem was corrected, it was apparently done so at the sacrifice of other people's careers, Sample said.
Other airmen and officers, who have been interviewed, confirm Sample's accounts to the letter.
The hardest pill to swallow, for the former airman, is that a commander on the base has made several public statements labeling Sample a traitor. If anything, Sample believes he has shed light on potential problems this country might incur in the event of nuclear war.
Sample is asking "the governor of Missouri, state senators, the state congressmen, to take a closer look at what is happening on Whiteman, and to do it properly this time."
Calling for an outside, impartial investigation of alleged nuclear safety violations at Whiteman, Sample said, "Get me a governor. Get me a congressman. Get me a senator. I'll talk to them. I'll tell them things they probably haven't heard."
NEXT: Olympic Arena
By Kenneth Amos
Star-Journal News Editor
(Fourth of a series)
Paul Geoffrey Sample is back home in his native California, far away from the daily grind at Whiteman Air Force Base. However, the 27-year-old former senior airman still agonizes about the unacceptable manner in which nuclear weapons have been handled at the base, and the subsequent way he has been treated for simply doing what he believed was his duty.
Sample, a former missile-maintenance specialist, was separated from the Air Force last October via an honorable discharge. However, he claims he was one of the lucky ones.
Part of Sample's story has been told before. Earlier this year, in a newspaper interview, he told of learning of weapons mishandling within the Re-Entry Vehicle Maintenance Branch of the 351st Field Maintenance Missile Squadron. The problem was that a missile on alert contained a targeting error in its re-entry vehicle weapon. He maintained the error was covered up by airmen and a sergeant in the maintenance area.
The error, he said, possibly could have caused one of the 150 Minuteman missiles controlled at Whiteman Air Force Base to explode short of its intended target.
An investigation by the Air Force ensued during which Sample testified. Missouri Fourth District Congressman Ike Skelton earlier this year asked for a briefing about this particular investigation from the Air Force.
The Air Force confirmed there was indeed a targeting error that would have produced "a less-than-optimal target burst."
Skelton also was informed that an unreliable Penetration Aid (Pen Aid) had been discovered. A Pen Aid, loosely defined, helps a weapon hide from enemy radar.
The military branch maintained the problem with the Pen Aid was detected before it could be installed into a missile on alert.
The Air Force also assured Skelton the problems had been corrected and sufficient precautions taken to ensure they would never happen again. A sergeant involved allegedly concealed the problem and supposedly was disciplined.
Sample, earlier this week, revealed that part of the story has not been made public. He said that he and several other airmen testified they had discovered not one, but several unreliable Pen Aids, contrary to the public admission by the Air Force. He maintains at least one was installed into a missile that was on alert. Yet another was on its way to the field.
The former airman said the only reason the Pen Aid did not reach its destination is because "I substituted if for a good one at the last minute."
He added the NCO in his section had told him the Pen Aids were reliable.
Several in one of the maintenance bays were scheduled to go out in a couple of weeks," Sample said.
He said none had been tested or could have possibly been tested in that timeframe.
I could have just let them go to the field and allowed something to go wrong, therefore establishing a trend," he said.
Sample said at least 13 Pen Aids were suspected of being unreliable, and he eventually narrowed that group to five or six.
"They were definitely on their way out (to the field) unless someone stopped them," he said.
For a Pen Aid to be termed "unreliable," a serious problem does not have to be substantiated, according to Sample. A Pen Aid is deemed unreliable if it is not checked out properly and there is no way to know how it would perform. Subsequent tests proved all Pen Aids in question to be reliable.
Sample said he has been disheartened that it has taken this long for a congressman to pay attention to his allegations.
In the past, he charged that persons looking into the problems "have come down the chain of command to where the problem started, and it feeds back up the chain of command that there is nothing wrong, and the whole thing is covered up."
Sample said he finally heard from one of Skelton's aides in Washington, D.C., yesterday. He was asked for more information about his allegations
From the beginning
Sample's plight began several years ago when he became aware of the aforementioned problems from a co-worker who mentioned it "rather casually (and) was unspecific."
He claimed the problem existed and was known of during the Defense Nuclear Agency Inspection at WAFB in 1978.
"There was a problem with a warhead in the field. He wouldn't really say where it was, what the problem was, or what the maintenance schedule for it was."
Sample said it took about six months for him to gain the confidence of those who knew about the problem so they would become more specific about its exact nature.
I found out that it was a targeting problem."
Saying he could not expound further because of his concern about revealing classified information, Sample said had the problem gone uncorrected, the missile involved would not have performed as it was designed.
"There was no danger to the American population," he said, "in this case."
Sample said the main obstacle that took so long in approaching the problem was "the atmosphere in the shop. Everyone was afraid to talk about it. It was something that was never spoken of, never brought up."
Extreme tension, fear and suspicion were words Sample used to describe the atmosphere in his work center.
In response to this allegation, Air Force officials at Whiteman replied: " Inspections by Strategic Air Command's missile evaluation squadron rated our munitions program areas from satisfactory to outstanding in October 1980. An April 1981 inspection by the SAC inspector general rated the re-entry vehicle branch 'excellent' and the associated technical operations 'outstanding.' "
Sample and other airmen, after learning enough about the problem, approached their supervisors.
I was surprised to find they didn't want to deal with it. I was given an explanation that these things are usually kept within the shop."
Sample was told it was on a "hypothetical" situation.
"Nobody had any specific information on it. ... The people who had the actual knowledge of the incident, and who had witnessed it, wouldn't discuss it."
Then, one of Sample's co-workers approached Whiteman's three squadron officials with the information about the targeting error.
"They also refused to do anything about it," Sample maintained. "It wasn't like they refused to him; it's just that nothing happened. There was no response. No one came in to correct the problem."
Sample said the situation then was reported to the base inspector general (IG).
"It was immediately and promptly corrected," he said. "The inspector general's investigator was appointed on Whiteman. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) subsequently investigated it, and the Air Force investigator was sent down to Whiteman," Sample said.
In the week's interval between the time the problem was reported to the base IG, and when the Air Force Investigator finally arrived, "three top officials in the squadron, who had knowledge of this incident and had made no attempt to correct it, were place in exclusive access of all classified records for the entire weapons system." He claims this is out of the norm when it comes to investigative procedures.
The OSI's investigation lasted only three days. Without warning, it was pulled off the case, according to Sample. He was told the OSI had found no criminal action involved.
Sample, a primary witness, had provided three affidavits and hours of sworn and taped testimony pertaining to the actions of the branch supervisors.
He provided material evidence, and, in return, contends an OSI agent assured him that measures would be taken to relieve him from serving under the authority of the individuals against whom he had testified. Also, he claims he was assured that his Airman Performance Reports (APRs) would not have to be endorsed by these individuals.
Sample said he was told non-judicial punishment was administered to both supervisors. Allegedly, they were fined and suspended from duty for almost five months.
One was fully reinstated to his duty position as the Branch Noncommissioned Officer In Charge. The other was reinstated and given new duties as Quality Control Inspector for the Branch. Each had their personnel reliability status restored.
"After all this time, they were returned to duty as if nothing ever happened," Sample said. "The shop functioned as it was before. The same people were there. I was there. The other witnesses were there. The chain of command was the same.
"At that point, I tentatively resigned."
Three days later, in April 1980, Sample contends his latest APR was recalled from the records section by one of the sergeants for "corrections." The report was downgraded.
The revised report ran counter to comments of Sample's supervisor, who had recommended him for an Air Force Commendation Medal.
Sample called it "the most derogatory report they could have given anyone without supporting evidence."
He had gone to his squadron commander's office and said that "under no circumstances am I going to work under these people in view of what they have done."
Sample then received an assignment to Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, only to find out he had been assigned to work under a supervisor who was a close personal friend of one of the supervisors against whom he had given testimony.
Time to move on
Sample asked the squadron commander to interrupt his assignment overseas. The squadron commander, the only person with the authority to do so, refused.
Sample took up the matter with officials in the OSI office.
"They refused to even discuss it with me."
The OSI, Sample claims, did not comply with its promises and procedures to protect his career from administrative abuse.
Sample said the situation boiled down to this: Those who provided testimony were referred to (the) mental health (section) for aberrant personality or character disorders. They had testified against their supervisors. They had complained about being forced to work under people against whom they had testified. The working environment was unacceptable. There were no provisions to protect them. And, they were shipped off to the psychiatric ward.
This happened to Sample, too, albeit in a roundabout way.
"I went to the mental health section to ask them an administrative question about the reliability program. A day later, my commander found out that I had been over there. He ordered me to return for psychiatric evaluation on the basis that I had submitted myself for an evaluation previously and then refused evaluation, which is totally not true. At no time did I ever willingly submit myself for evaluation. I had no need to. I never had any doubt about my own reliability."
Sample, who had been decertified in accordance with the Air Force's Personnel Reliability Program, underwent six months of psychiatric evaluations. In the meantime, he was placed on "medical hold" and his assignment to South Korea was cancelled.
Only a few months earlier, Sample was going places in the Air Force. Earlier APRs contain comments such as: "Sample performs all his duties in an excellent manner. His resourcefulness, foresight and professional job knowledge clearly are reflected in the day-to-day operations. Also, Sample sets and example of the highest tradition of military professionalism and consistently demands exceptional performance from his co-workers. His is an alert airman who is highly intelligent. ..."
Now, while under observation, he had been assigned various menial duties around the base, including trash detail and the wash rack.
"Wash rack was an assignment for three months — scrubbing the tar off trucks — a duty I'm sure they considered was fully commensurate with my ability and my training," he said sarcastically while noting that airmen usually are assigned this detail for one week at a time.
After six months of ongoing evaluations, "the hospital finally concluded there were no mental disorders, no psychiatric disorders, no character or behavioral disorders."
Sample filed for separation from the Air Force and appealed his performance reports.
During the evaluations, Sample had filed requests to be cross-trained, transferred to another base or discharged.
"In two weeks, I was decertified permanently from my reliability status by my squadron commander. That means I will never ever again be authorized to work around any nuclear materials of any kind, in any capacity. That is all I have been trained to do for the past three years. They just declared me totally useless for what they had trained me to do."
He said the Air Force reluctantly accepted his request for a hardship discharge.
After the discharge, he received a letter ordering him never to set foot on the base again. Also, his performance report had been reversed and corrected. However, he said his request for reinstatement of his reliability status "has virtually been disregarded."
Reviewing his experiences, Sample asks:
*Why was everyone so frightened in that maintenance shop? They wouldn't even talk about a problem; they were more afraid of correcting it than they were of covering it up.
"That's an inexcusable condition. The condition still exists. If the Air Force tries to make an example of me it will exist to an even greater extent. Their image isn't worth the risk to national security of covering up some of these problems. They are much too serious.
- "Why were witnesses not protected?
- Why were derogatory performance reports given to those people?
- Why were three top squadron officials placed in exclusive access to classified information after they had refused to pursue their chain of command to correct the problem with that one missile?
- Why were the supervisors reinstated to their original positions, which require the highest reliability of any military job, after performing acts that would clearly decertify them from their reliability? Yet, other people who obviously are more reliable, have been decertified under psychiatric pretenses."
While this problem was corrected, it was apparently done so at the sacrifice of other people's careers, Sample said.
Other airmen and officers, who have been interviewed, confirm Sample's accounts to the letter.
The hardest pill to swallow, for the former airman, is that a commander on the base has made several public statements labeling Sample a traitor. If anything, Sample believes he has shed light on potential problems this country might incur in the event of nuclear war.
Sample is asking "the governor of Missouri, state senators, the state congressmen, to take a closer look at what is happening on Whiteman, and to do it properly this time."
Calling for an outside, impartial investigation of alleged nuclear safety violations at Whiteman, Sample said, "Get me a governor. Get me a congressman. Get me a senator. I'll talk to them. I'll tell them things they probably haven't heard."
NEXT: Olympic Arena